Social pacts revisited: 'Competitive concertation’ and complex causality in negotiated welfare state reforms created by Nico A. Siegel
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- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 09596801
- HD8371 EUR
Item type | Current library | Call number | Vol info | Copy number | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | |
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Main Library - Special Collections | HD8371 EUR (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Vol. 11, no. 1 (pages 107-126) | 75 | Not for loan | For in house use |
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This article discusses three major issues related to tripartite social pacts: first, the puzzles they present for classic theories of corporatism; second, the contrasts between the political economies of ‘competitive concertation’ and Keynesian coordination; and third, the problems of assessing their effects in the context of complex causality. The main focus is on one specific policy area: negotiated welfare state reforms. The conclusion is that though such negotiations have dominated the process of welfare state recalibration in Europe during the 1990s, tripartite social pacts are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for success.
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