Why don’t foreign firms cooperate in US antidumping investigations?: An empirical analysis created by Michael O. Moore and Alan K. Fox

By:

Moore, Michael [author]

Contributor(s):

Fox, Alan [co-author]

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Review of World Economics ; Volume 145, number 1London: Sage, 2010Content type:

text

Media type:

unmediated

Carrier type:

volume

ISSN:

16102878

Subject(s):

Antidumping -- Facts-available -- US trade policy -- United States

LOC classification:

HF1351 REV

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Abstract: Foreign firms face punitive duties if they do not cooperate with the US Department of Commerce (DOC) in antidumping procedures. For example, 37% of all foreign firms involved in antidumping investigations in the US faced “facts available” margins for the 1995–2002 period, with average antidumping duties of 31% for cooperating foreign firms, compared to 87% for those who did not cooperate. The existing literature has focused on how DOC discretion has led to foreign firm non-cooperation. This paper instead examines individual foreign firm’s decisions about whether to cooperate during this same period. We find evidence that non-cooperation is consistent with a model of foreign firms rationally choosing not to cooperate, rather than solely as a result of investigating authority bias against imports.

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Vol info	Copy number	Status	Notes	Date due	Barcode
Journal Article	Main Library Journal Article	HF1351 REV (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Vol. 145, no. 2 (pages 597-614)	SP3242	Not for loan	For in house use

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Foreign firms face punitive duties if they do not cooperate with the US Department of Commerce (DOC) in antidumping procedures. For example, 37% of all foreign firms involved in antidumping investigations in the US faced “facts available” margins for the 1995–2002 period, with average antidumping duties of 31% for cooperating foreign firms, compared to 87% for those who did not cooperate. The existing literature has focused on how DOC discretion has led to foreign firm non-cooperation. This paper instead examines individual foreign firm’s decisions about whether to cooperate during this same period. We find evidence that non-cooperation is consistent with a model of foreign firms rationally choosing not to cooperate, rather than solely as a result of investigating authority bias against imports.

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