A reassessment of the Werner Plan and the Delors Report: why did they experience a different fate? Dimitrios Syrrakos
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- 08887233
- HB90 COM
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Main Library - Special Collections | HB90 COM (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Vol. 52, no. 4 (pages 575-588) | SP6232 | Not for loan | For in house use |
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The aim of this paper is to compare and contrast the Werner Plan and the Delors Report and to explain why the latter succeeded in facilitating the realisation of the European Monetary Union. Thus, the environment that contributed to the successful implementation of the latter and the major politico-economic developments in the European Economic Community are assessed. This will shed further light upon the nature of the road that led to the establishment of the EMU and inform judgements concerning its viability. The major conclusion is that the Delors Report was successful due to the institutional approach it envisaged and the political momentum this approach gathered. Consequently, it can provide an example for the resolution of current international monetary problems.
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