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Sudden stops, time inconsistency, and the duration of sovereign debt created by Juan Carlos Hatchondo; Leonardo Martinez

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: International economic journal ; Volume 27, number 2Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2013Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISSN:
  • 10168737
Subject(s): LOC classification:
  • HB1A1 INT
Online resources: Abstract: We study the sovereign debt duration chosen by the government in the context of a standard model of sovereign default. The government balances off increasing the duration of its debt to mitigate rollover risk and lowering duration to mitigate the debt dilution problem. We present two main results. First, when the government decides the debt duration on a sequential basis, sudden stop risk increases the average duration by 1 year. Second, we illustrate the time inconsistency problem in the choice of sovereign debt duration: governments would like to commit to a duration that is 1.7 years shorter than the one they choose when decisions are made sequentially.
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Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Vol info Copy number Status Notes Date due Barcode
Journal Article Journal Article Main Library - Special Collections HB1A1 INT (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Vol. 27, no. 2 (pages 217-228) SP18072 Not for loan For In house Use

We study the sovereign debt duration chosen by the government in the context of a standard model of sovereign default. The government balances off increasing the duration of its debt to mitigate rollover risk and lowering duration to mitigate the debt dilution problem. We present two main results. First, when the government decides the debt duration on a sequential basis, sudden stop risk increases the average duration by 1 year. Second, we illustrate the time inconsistency problem in the choice of sovereign debt duration: governments would like to commit to a duration that is 1.7 years shorter than the one they choose when decisions are made sequentially.

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