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Partial privatization and yardstick competition: evidence from employment dynamics in Bangladesh/ created by V. Bhaskar, Bishnupriya Gupta and Mushtaq Khan

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Economics of transition ; Volume 14, number 3Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISSN:
  • 09670750
Subject(s): LOC classification:
  • HC244 ECO
Online resources: Abstract: We analyse the dynamics of public and private sector employment in Bangladesh, using the natural experiment provided by the partial privatization of the jute industry. The public sector had substantial excess employment of workers initially, but this excess was substantially eroded by the end of the period we studied. The extent of erosion differs between white-collar and manual worker categories, with excess employment persisting only in the former. Our findings suggest that partial privatization increases the efficacy of yardstick competition in the regulation of public firms, because heterogeneous ownership undermines collusion between public sector managers, and also makes excess employment more transparent to the general public.
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Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Vol info Copy number Status Notes Date due Barcode
Journal Article Journal Article Main Library - Special Collections HC244 ECO (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Vol. 14, no.3 (pages 459-478) SP698 Not for loan For in house use only

We analyse the dynamics of public and private sector employment in Bangladesh, using the natural experiment provided by the partial privatization of the jute industry. The public sector had substantial excess employment of workers initially, but this excess was substantially eroded by the end of the period we studied. The extent of erosion differs between white-collar and manual worker categories, with excess employment persisting only in the former. Our findings suggest that partial privatization increases the efficacy of yardstick competition in the regulation of public firms, because heterogeneous ownership undermines collusion between public sector managers, and also makes excess employment more transparent to the general public.

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