Price competition and innovation in markets with brand loyalty created by Robert C. Schmidt
Material type:
- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 09318658
- HB171.5 JOU
Item type | Current library | Call number | Vol info | Copy number | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | |
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Main Library - Special Collections | HB171.5 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Vol. 109, no. 2 (pages 147-174) | SP20886 | Not for loan | For In house Use |
Intuition suggests that in markets with consumer lock-in (‘brand loyalty’), firms with a large customer base earn higher profits. We show for a homogeneous goods duopoly that the intuition can be misleading, as the intensity of price competition depends on the initial market split. We derive mixed-strategy equilibria, and show that competition is often most intense when the market is split evenly. As a result, firms coordinate on an asymmetric split when consumers are not yet attached to firms. We also allow for asymmetric costs, and analyze when firms with a larger customer base are more eager to innovate
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