Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach created by Leonid Polishchuk and Alexander Tonis

By:

Polishchuk, Leonid [author]

Contributor(s):

Tonis, Alexander [co author]

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Economic theory ; Volume 52, number 1Berlin: Springer, 2013Content type:

text

Media type:

unmediated

Carrier type:

volume

ISSN:

09382259

Subject(s):

LOC classification:

09582259

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Abstract: We describe optimal contest success functions (CSF) which maximize expected revenues of an administrator who allocates under informational asymmetry a source of rent among competing bidders. It is shown that in the case of independent private values rent administrator’s optimal mechanism can always be implemented via some CSFs as posited by Tullock. Optimal endogenous CSFs have properties which are often assumed a priori as plausible features of rent-seeking contests; the paper therefore validates such assumptions for a broad class of contests. Various extensions or optimal CSFs are analyzed.

Reviews from LibraryThing.com:

Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.

Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Vol info	Copy number	Status	Notes	Date due	Barcode
Journal Article	Main Library - Special Collections	HB119 ECO (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Vol. 52, no.1 (pages 271-298)	SP21038	Not for loan	For in house use only

Browsing Main Library shelves, Shelving location: - Special Collections Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)

Previous	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	Next
Previous	HB119 ECO Oligarchy, democracy, and state capacity	HB119 ECO Unhedgeable shocks and statistical economic equilibrium	HB119 ECO Existence of equilibrium in the Helpman—Krugman model of international trade with imperfect competition	HB119 ECO Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach	HB119 ECO Non-existence of competitive equilibria with dynamically inconsistent preferences	HB119 ECO Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods	HB119 ECO Information revelation in competitive markets	Next

We describe optimal contest success functions (CSF) which maximize expected revenues of an administrator who allocates under informational asymmetry a source of rent among competing bidders. It is shown that in the case of independent private values rent administrator’s optimal mechanism can always be implemented via some CSFs as posited by Tullock. Optimal endogenous CSFs have properties which are often assumed a priori as plausible features of rent-seeking contests; the paper therefore validates such assumptions for a broad class of contests. Various extensions or optimal CSFs are analyzed.

There are no comments on this title.

to post a comment.

here