Ideology and endogenous constitutions/ created by Alessandro Riboni

By:

Riboni, Alessandro [author]

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Economic theory ; Volume 52, number 3Berlin: Springer, 2013Content type:

text

Media type:

unmediated

Carrier type:

volume

ISSN:

09382259

Subject(s):

LOC classification:

HB119 ECO

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Abstract: We study a legislature where decisions are made by playing an agenda-setting game. Legislators are concerned about their electoral prospects but they are also genuinely concerned for the legislature to make the correct decision. We show that when ideological polarization is positive but not too large (and the status quo is extremely inefficient), institutions in which the executive has either no constraints (autocracy) or many constraints (unanimity) are preferable to democracies that operate under an intermediate number of constraints (simple majority rule). When instead ideological polarization is large (and the status quo is only moderately inefficient), simple majority turns out to be preferable.

Reviews from LibraryThing.com:

Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.

Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Vol info	Copy number	Status	Notes	Date due	Barcode
Journal Article	Main Library - Special Collections	HB119 ECO (Browse shelf(Opens below))	vol. 52, no. 3 (pages 885-914)	SP21293	Not for loan	For in house use
Journal Article	Main Library - Special Collections	HB119 ECO (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Vol. 52, no.3 (pages 885-914)	SP21041	Not for loan	For in house use

Browsing Main Library shelves, Shelving location: - Special Collections Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)

Previous	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	Next
Previous	HB119 ECO An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games/	HB119 ECO Reputation from nested activities	HB119 ECO A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection/ created by Vincent Anesi and Philippe De Donder	HB119 ECO Ideology and endogenous constitutions/	HB119 ECO The intellectual influence of economic journals: quality versus quantity/	HB119 ECO Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition	HB119 ECO Second-order ambiguous beliefs/	Next

We study a legislature where decisions are made by playing an agenda-setting game. Legislators are concerned about their electoral prospects but they are also genuinely concerned for the legislature to make the correct decision. We show that when ideological polarization is positive but not too large (and the status quo is extremely inefficient), institutions in which the executive has either no constraints (autocracy) or many constraints (unanimity) are preferable to democracies that operate under an intermediate number of constraints (simple majority rule). When instead ideological polarization is large (and the status quo is only moderately inefficient), simple majority turns out to be preferable.

There are no comments on this title.

to post a comment.

here