Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities by Hidekazu Anno and Hiroo Sasaki

By:

Anno, Hidekazu [author]

Contributor(s):

Sasaki, Hiroo [co-author]

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Economic theory ; Volume 54, number 3Content type:

text

Media type:

unmediated

Carrier type:

volume

ISSN:

0938-2259

Subject(s):

Allocation rules -- Strategy-proofness -- Multiple commodities

LOC classification:

HB119 ECO

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Abstract: We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with perfectly divisible multiple commodities and single-peaked preferences. In this setup, it is known that the incompatibility among strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and non-dictatorship arises in contrast with the Sprumont (Econometrica 59:509–519, 1991) one commodity model. We first investigate the existence problem of strategy-proof and second-best efficient rules, where a strategy-proof rule is second-best efficient if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other strategy-proof rules. We show that there exists an egalitarian rational (consequently, non-dictatorial) strategy-proof rule satisfying second-best efficiency. Second, we give a new characterization of the generalized uniform rule with the second-best efficiency in two-agent case.

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Vol info	Copy number	Status	Notes	Date due	Barcode
Journal Article	Main Library - Special Collections	HB119 ECO (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Vol. 54 no.3 (pages 693-716)	SP21289	Not for loan	For In House Use Only
Journal Article	Main Library - Special Collections	HB119 ECO (Browse shelf(Opens below))	vol. 54, no. 3 (pages 693-716)	SP21040	Not for loan	For in house use

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We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with perfectly divisible multiple commodities and single-peaked preferences. In this setup, it is known that the incompatibility among strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and non-dictatorship arises in contrast with the Sprumont (Econometrica 59:509–519, 1991) one commodity model. We first investigate the existence problem of strategy-proof and second-best efficient rules, where a strategy-proof rule is second-best efficient if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other strategy-proof rules. We show that there exists an egalitarian rational (consequently, non-dictatorial) strategy-proof rule satisfying second-best efficiency. Second, we give a new characterization of the generalized uniform rule with the second-best efficiency in two-agent case.

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