Comparison of equilibrium actions and payoffs across players in games of strategic complements created by Natalia Lazzati

By:

Lazzati, Natalia [author]

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Economic theory ; Volume 54, number 3Heildelberg : Springer, 2013Content type:

text

Media type:

unmediated

Carrier type:

volume

ISSN:

0938-2259

Subject(s):

LOC classification:

HB119 ECO

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Abstract: This paper provides sufficient conditions for comparing the choices of different players in games of strategic complements. The main results require a weak ordering relation on the best responses of players in the game and their constraint sets. Under additional restrictions, we can also compare their relative payoffs. We offer three applications of our idea to industrial organization and new models of behavioral economics. Specifically, we study horizontal mergers in oligopolies, competition among firms with differentiated demands and costs of production, and a model of biased perceptions

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Vol info	Copy number	Status	Notes	Date due	Barcode
Journal Article	Main Library - Special Collections	HB119 ECO (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Vol. 54, no. 3 (pages 777-788)	SP21289	Not for loan	For In House Use Only
Journal Article	Main Library - Special Collections	HB119 ECO (Browse shelf(Opens below))	vol. 54, no. 3 (pages 777-788)	SP21040	Not for loan	For in house use

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Previous	HB119 ECO Strategies in the principal-agent model	HB119 ECO Regular type distributions in mechanism design and -concavity	HB119 ECO Asymmetric information and rationalizability	HB119 ECO Comparison of equilibrium actions and payoffs across players in games of strategic complements	HB119 ECO Inductive reasoning about unawareness	HB119 ECO Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities	HB119 ECO Inequality aversion and separability in social risk evaluation	Next

This paper provides sufficient conditions for comparing the choices of different players in games of strategic complements. The main results require a weak ordering relation on the best responses of players in the game and their constraint sets. Under additional restrictions, we can also compare their relative payoffs. We offer three applications of our idea to industrial organization and new models of behavioral economics. Specifically, we study horizontal mergers in oligopolies, competition among firms with differentiated demands and costs of production, and a model of biased perceptions

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