Comparison of equilibrium actions and payoffs across players in games of strategic complements created by Natalia Lazzati
Material type:
- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 0938-2259
- HB119 ECO
Item type | Current library | Call number | Vol info | Copy number | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | |
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Main Library - Special Collections | HB119 ECO (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Vol. 54, no. 3 (pages 777-788) | SP21289 | Not for loan | For In House Use Only | |||
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Main Library - Special Collections | HB119 ECO (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | vol. 54, no. 3 (pages 777-788) | SP21040 | Not for loan | For in house use |
This paper provides sufficient conditions for comparing the choices of different players in games of strategic complements. The main results require a weak ordering relation on the best responses of players in the game and their constraint sets. Under additional restrictions, we can also compare their relative payoffs. We offer three applications of our idea to industrial organization and new models of behavioral economics. Specifically, we study horizontal mergers in oligopolies, competition among firms with differentiated demands and costs of production, and a model of biased perceptions
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