A full characterization of nash implementation with strategy space reduction by Michele Lombardi and Naoki Yoshihara

By:

Lombardi, Michele [author]

Contributor(s):

Yoshihara, Naoki [co-author]

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Economic theory ; Volume 54, number 1Heildelberg : Springer, 2013Content type:

text

Media type:

unmediated

Carrier type:

volume

Subject(s):

Nash implementation

LOC classification:

HB119 ECO

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Summary: The paper fully characterizes the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) by mechanisms endowed with Saijo’s message space specification— -mechanisms. This class of SCCs is equivalent to the class of Nash implementable SCCs, though any game form involving ‘one less’ preference announcements breaks this equivalence relationship down.

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Vol info	Copy number	Status	Notes	Date due	Barcode
Journal Article	Main Library - Special Collections	HB119 ECO (Browse shelf(Opens below))	vol. 54, no. 1 (pages 131-152)	SP21036	Not for loan	For In house Use

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Previous	HB119 ECO Essential equilibria of discontinuous games	HB119 ECO The best choice problem under ambiguity	HB119 ECO An alternative characterization of top trading cycles	HB119 ECO A full characterization of nash implementation with strategy space reduction	HB119 ECO Approximation results for discontinuous games with an application to equilibrium refinement	HB119 ECO Information acquisition and welfare effect in a model of competitive financial markets	HB119 ECO Existence of perfect equilibria: a direct proof	Next

The paper fully characterizes the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) by mechanisms endowed with Saijo’s message space specification— -mechanisms. This class of SCCs is equivalent to the class of Nash implementable SCCs, though any game form involving ‘one less’ preference announcements breaks this equivalence relationship down.

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