Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks created by Ruben Juarez & Rajnish Kumar

By:

Juarez, Ruben [author]

Contributor(s):

Kumar, Rajnish [co author]

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Economic theory ; Volume 54, number 2Berlin: Springer, 2013Content type:

text

Media type:

unmediated

Carrier type:

volume

ISSN:

09382259

Subject(s):

LOC classification:

HB119 ECO

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Abstract: We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a network that meets the connection demands of a set of agents. The agents simultaneously choose paths in the network connecting their demand nodes. A mechanism splits the total cost of the network formed among the participants. We introduce two new properties of implementation. The first property, Pareto Nash implementation (PNI), requires that the efficient outcome always be implemented in a Nash equilibrium and that the efficient outcome Pareto dominates any other Nash equilibrium. The average cost mechanism and other asymmetric variations are the only mechanisms that meet PNI. These mechanisms are also characterized under strong Nash implementation. The second property, weakly Pareto Nash implementation (WPNI), requires that the least inefficient equilibrium Pareto dominates any other equilibrium. The egalitarian mechanism (EG) and other asymmetric variations are the only mechanisms that meet WPNI and individual rationality. EG minimizes the price of stability across all individually rational mechanisms.

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Vol info	Copy number	Status	Notes	Date due	Barcode
Journal Article	Main Library - Special Collections	HB119 ECO (Browse shelf(Opens below))	vol. 54, no. 2 (pages 359-404)	SP21039	Not for loan	For In house Use
Journal Article	Main Library - Special Collections	HB119 ECO (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Vol. 54, no.2 (pages 359-404)	SP21287	Not for loan	For In house Use

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We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a network that meets the connection demands of a set of agents. The agents simultaneously choose paths in the network connecting their demand nodes. A mechanism splits the total cost of the network formed among the participants. We introduce two new properties of implementation. The first property, Pareto Nash implementation (PNI), requires that the efficient outcome always be implemented in a Nash equilibrium and that the efficient outcome Pareto dominates any other Nash equilibrium. The average cost mechanism and other asymmetric variations are the only mechanisms that meet PNI. These mechanisms are also characterized under strong Nash implementation. The second property, weakly Pareto Nash implementation (WPNI), requires that the least inefficient equilibrium Pareto dominates any other equilibrium. The egalitarian mechanism (EG) and other asymmetric variations are the only mechanisms that meet WPNI and individual rationality. EG minimizes the price of stability across all individually rational mechanisms.

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