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Production externalities: internalization by voting by Hervé Crès, Mich Tvede

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Economic theory ; Volume 53, number 2Heildelberg : Springer, 2013Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
Subject(s): LOC classification:
  • HB119 ECO
Online resources: Summary: We study internalization of production externalities in perfectly competitive markets where production plans are decided by majority voting. Since shareholders want firms to maximize dividends of portfolios rather than profits, they are interested in some internalization. Two governances, namely the shareholder governance (one share, one vote) and the stakeholder democracy (one stakeholder, one vote), are compared. We argue that perfect internalization is more likely to be the outcome of the stakeholder democracy than the shareholder governance
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Item type Current library Call number Vol info Copy number Status Notes Date due Barcode
Journal Article Journal Article Main Library - Special Collections HB119 ECO (Browse shelf(Opens below)) vol. 53, no. 2 (pages 403-424) SP21037 Not for loan For In house Use

We study internalization of production externalities in perfectly competitive markets where production plans are decided by majority voting. Since shareholders want firms to maximize dividends of portfolios rather than profits, they are interested in some internalization. Two governances, namely the shareholder governance (one share, one vote) and the stakeholder democracy (one stakeholder, one vote), are compared. We argue that perfect internalization is more likely to be the outcome of the stakeholder democracy than the shareholder governance

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