Welfare effects of short-sale constraints under heterogeneous beliefs Hiroyuki Nakata
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Main Library - Special Collections | HB119 ECO (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Vol.53 , No.2 (pages283-314) | SP21037 | Not for loan | For In house Use |
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This paper examines the welfare effects of short-sale constraints in an overlapping generations model of a financial economy with heterogeneous beliefs by focussing on the case of rational beliefs in the sense of Kurz (Econ Theory 4:877–900, 1994). To measure the social welfare, we adopt a measure that is based on the ex post social welfare concept in the sense of Hammond (Economica 48:235–250, 1981), instead of the standard ex ante criterion, since heterogeneity in beliefs invalidates it. Simulation results indicate the existence of socially optimal short-sale constraints
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