Does higher malpractice pressure deter medical errors? created by Toshiaki Iizuka
Material type: TextSeries: Journal of Law and Economics ; Volume 56, number 1Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013Content type:- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 00222186
- HB73 JOU
Item type | Current library | Call number | Vol info | Copy number | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | |
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Journal Article | Main Library - Special Collections | HB73 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Vol. 56, no.3 (pages 161-188) | SP17578 | Not for loan | For In House Use Only |
An important objective of medical liability law is to deter medical errors by punishing negligent mistakes. However, relatively little evidence exists on the deterrence effect. Using newly constructed measures of preventable medical complications and state tort reforms in the United States between 1994 and 2007, I found evidence that higher liability pressure deters preventable medical complications related to four specific obstetrics/gynecology procedures. The results also showed that the effects of tort reforms vary by the specific reform in question: while joint and several liability reform (which increases doctor accountability) appear to decrease preventable medical complications, collateral source rule reform and caps on punitive damages appear to increase these complications. Opponents of tort reform often argue that tort reforms may adversely affect patient safety, and the results of this paper suggest that such a concern is legitimate
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