Does shareholder proxy access improve firm value? evidence from the business roundtable challenge created by Bo Becker, Daniel Bergstresser and Guhan Subramanian

By:

Becker, Bo [author]

Contributor(s):

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Journal of Law and Economics ; Volume 56, number 1Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013Content type:

text

Media type:

unmediated

Carrier type:

volume

ISSN:

00222186

Subject(s):

LOC classification:

HB73 JOU

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Abstract: We use the Business Roundtable's challenge to the SEC's 2010 proxy access rule as a natural experiment to measure the value of shareholder proxy access. We find that firms that would have been most vulnerable to proxy access, as measured by institutional ownership and activist institutional ownership in particular, lost value on October 4, 2010, when the SEC unexpectedly announced that it would delay implementation of the Rule in response to the Business Roundtable challenge. We also examine intra-day returns and find that the value loss occurred just after the SEC's announcement on October 4. We find similar results on July 22, 2011, when the D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the Business Roundtable. These findings are consistent with the view that financial markets placed a positive value on shareholder access, as implemented in the SEC's 2010 Rule

Reviews from LibraryThing.com:

Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.

Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Copy number	Status	Notes	Date due	Barcode
Journal Article	Main Library - Special Collections	HB73 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below))	SP17578	Not for loan	For In House Use Only

Browsing Main Library shelves, Shelving location: - Special Collections Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)

Previous	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	Next
Previous	HB73 JOU An activity-generating theory of regulation	HB73 JOU Elected versus appointed policy makers: evidence from city treasurers	HB73 JOU Reforming fisheries: lessons from a self-selected cooperative	HB73 JOU Does shareholder proxy access improve firm value? evidence from the business roundtable challenge	HB73 JOU Does higher malpractice pressure deter medical errors?	HB73 JOU Law firm expertise and merger and acquisition outcomes	HB73 JOU The impact of a mandatory cooling-off period on divorce	Next

We use the Business Roundtable's challenge to the SEC's 2010 proxy access rule as a natural experiment to measure the value of shareholder proxy access. We find that firms that would have been most vulnerable to proxy access, as measured by institutional ownership and activist institutional ownership in particular, lost value on October 4, 2010, when the SEC unexpectedly announced that it would delay implementation of the Rule in response to the Business Roundtable challenge. We also examine intra-day returns and find that the value loss occurred just after the SEC's announcement on October 4. We find similar results on July 22, 2011, when the D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the Business Roundtable. These findings are consistent with the view that financial markets placed a positive value on shareholder access, as implemented in the SEC's 2010 Rule

There are no comments on this title.

to post a comment.

here