Elected versus appointed policy makers: evidence from city treasurers created by Alexander Whalley

By:

Whalley, Alexander [author]

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Journal of Law and Economics ; Volume 56, number 1Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013Content type:

text

Media type:

unmediated

Carrier type:

volume

ISSN:

00222186

Subject(s):

LOC classification:

HB73 JOU

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Abstract: This paper investigates whether the method of selecting public officials affects policy making. I compare the policy choices of bureaucrat city treasurers and politician city treasurers, who are selected and held accountable in very different ways. The analysis draws on rich data from California to examine whether cities with appointed or elected city treasurers pay lower costs to borrow. The results demonstrate that having appointive treasurers reduces a city’s cost of borrowing by 19-31 percent. Holding officials directly accountable to voters can result in lower levels of performance in complex policy areas

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Vol info	Copy number	Status	Notes	Date due	Barcode
Journal Article	Main Library - Special Collections	HB73 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Vol. 55, no.1 (pages 39-82)	SP17578	Not for loan	For In House Use Only

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This paper investigates whether the method of selecting public officials affects policy making. I compare the policy choices of bureaucrat city treasurers and politician city treasurers, who are selected and held accountable in very different ways. The analysis draws on rich data from California to examine whether cities with appointed or elected city treasurers pay lower costs to borrow. The results demonstrate that having appointive treasurers reduces a city’s cost of borrowing by 19-31 percent. Holding officials directly accountable to voters can result in lower levels of performance in complex policy areas

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