Conspiracy at the pump/ created by Can Erutku and Vincent A. Hildebrand

By:

Erutku, Can [author]

Contributor(s):

Hildebrand, Vincent A [co author]

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Journal of Law and Economics ; Volume 53, number 1Publisher: Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 2010Content type:

text

Media type:

unmediated

Carrier type:

volume

ISSN:

00222186

Subject(s):

LOC classification:

HB73 JOU

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Summary: On the basis of evidence of price‐fixing, in May 2006 the Canadian Competition Bureau targeted retail gasoline outlets in some local markets in the province of Quebec. In June 2008, criminal charges were filed against many individuals and companies operating in those local markets. We employ a differences‐in‐differences approach to determine whether the public announcement of the antitrust investigation triggered a reaction in one of the targeted markets. We find that the price of gasoline in the targeted market fell by 1.75 cents per liter after the public announcement of the investigation. We also briefly discuss how well the Stiglerian theory of collusion performs in this real‐world conspiracy

Reviews from LibraryThing.com:

Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.

Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Vol info	Copy number	Status	Notes	Date due	Barcode
Journal Article	Main Library Journal Article	HB73 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Vol. 53, no.1 (pages 223-237)	SP7325	Not for loan	For In House Use Only

Browsing Main Library shelves, Shelving location: Journal Article Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)

Previous	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	Next
Previous	HB73 JOU Ronald Coase’s First Amendment	HB73 JOU Measuring Coase’s Influence	HB73 JOU Unmarried fertility, crime, and social stigma/	HB73 JOU Conspiracy at the pump/	HB73 JOU Negotiation under possible third-party resolution	HB90 COM Decomposition of ethnic heterogeneity on growth/	HB119 ECO A unifying impossibility theorem	Next

On the basis of evidence of price‐fixing, in May 2006 the Canadian Competition Bureau targeted retail gasoline outlets in some local markets in the province of Quebec. In June 2008, criminal charges were filed against many individuals and companies operating in those local markets. We employ a differences‐in‐differences approach to determine whether the public announcement of the antitrust investigation triggered a reaction in one of the targeted markets. We find that the price of gasoline in the targeted market fell by 1.75 cents per liter after the public announcement of the investigation. We also briefly discuss how well the Stiglerian theory of collusion performs in this real‐world conspiracy

There are no comments on this title.

to post a comment.

here