Settle for Now but Block for Tomorrow: the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools created by Jo Seldeslachts, Joseph A. Clougherty and Pedro Pita Barros

By:

Seldeslachts, Jo [author]

Contributor(s):

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Journal of Law and Economics ; Volume 52, number 3Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 2009Content type:

text

Media type:

unmediated

Carrier type:

volume

ISSN:

00222186

Subject(s):

LOC classification:

HB73 JOU

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Summary: Antitrust policy involves not just the regulation of anticompetitive behavior but also an important deterrence effect. Neither scholars nor policy makers have fully researched the deterrence effects of merger policy tools because they have been unable to empirically measure these effects. We consider the ability of different antitrust actions—blocked mergers, negotiated settlements, and monitorings—to deter firms from engaging in mergers. We use cross‐jurisdiction/pantime data on merger policy to empirically estimate the impact of antitrust actions on future merger frequencies. We find that blocked mergers lead to decreased merger notifications in subsequent periods and that negotiated settlements weakly increase future merger notifications; in other words, blocked mergers involve a deterrence effect, but negotiated settlements do not

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Vol info	Copy number	Status	Notes	Date due	Barcode
Journal Article	Main Library - Special Collections	HB73 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Vol. 52, no.3 (pages 607-634)	SP4269	Not for loan	For In House Use Only

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Antitrust policy involves not just the regulation of anticompetitive behavior but also an important deterrence effect. Neither scholars nor policy makers have fully researched the deterrence effects of merger policy tools because they have been unable to empirically measure these effects. We consider the ability of different antitrust actions—blocked mergers, negotiated settlements, and monitorings—to deter firms from engaging in mergers. We use cross‐jurisdiction/pantime data on merger policy to empirically estimate the impact of antitrust actions on future merger frequencies. We find that blocked mergers lead to decreased merger notifications in subsequent periods and that negotiated settlements weakly increase future merger notifications; in other words, blocked mergers involve a deterrence effect, but negotiated settlements do not

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