Redistributive taxation and personal bankruptcy in U.S. States/ created by Charles Grant and Winfried Koeniger
Material type:
- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 00222186
- HB73 JOU
Item type | Current library | Call number | Vol info | Copy number | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | |
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Main Library - Special Collections | HB73 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Vol. 52, no.3 (pages 445-468) | SP4269 | Not for loan | For In House Use Only |
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Personal bankruptcy regulation and redistributive taxes and transfers vary considerably across U.S. states and over time. Our hypothesis is that both policies are imperfect substitutes in insuring consumption of risk‐averse agents in incomplete markets. Exploiting data variation over time for 18 U.S. states for the period 1980-2003, we find considerable support for this hypothesis: redistributive taxation and bankruptcy exemptions are negatively correlated, and both policies are associated with more equal consumption growth
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