The Effects of Political Connections and State Ownership on Corporate Litigation in China by Michael Firth, Oliver M. Rui and Wenfeng Wu

By:

Firth, Michael [author]

Contributor(s):

Material type: Text

TextSeries: The Journal of Law and Economics ; Volume 54, number 3Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 2011Content type:

text

Media type:

unmediated

Carrier type:

volume

ISSN:

00222186

Subject(s):

LOC classification:

HB73 JOU

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Summary: We examine the effects of corporate lawsuits in China and find that litigation announcements depress the stock prices of both defendant and plaintiff firms. Financially distressed defendants suffer lower stock returns. We find that politically connected defendants are favored in the judicial process: they have higher stock returns and are more likely to appeal against adverse outcomes and to obtain a favorable appeal result. State-controlled defendants fare better than privately controlled defendants when it comes to appeals but do not have higher stock returns. The evidence suggests that there is bias in the judicial process

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Vol info	Copy number	Status	Notes	Date due	Barcode
Journal Article	Main Library - Special Collections	HB73 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Vol. 54, no.3 (pages 573-608)	SP12292	Not for loan	For In House Use Only

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We examine the effects of corporate lawsuits in China and find that litigation announcements depress the stock prices of both defendant and plaintiff firms. Financially distressed defendants suffer lower stock returns. We find that politically connected defendants are favored in the judicial process: they have higher stock returns and are more likely to appeal against adverse outcomes and to obtain a favorable appeal result. State-controlled defendants fare better than privately controlled defendants when it comes to appeals but do not have higher stock returns. The evidence suggests that there is bias in the judicial process

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