Securing Private Property: formal versus Informal Institutions Claudia R. Williamson and Carrie B. Kerekes

By:

Williamson, Claudia R [author]

Contributor(s):

Kerekes, Carrie B [co author]

Material type: Text

TextSeries: The Journal of Law and Economics ; Volume 54, number 3Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 2011Content type:

text

Media type:

unmediated

Carrier type:

volume

ISSN:

00222186

Subject(s):

LOC classification:

HB73 JOU

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Summary: Property rights are one of the most fundamental and highly robust institutions supporting economic performance. However, the channels through which property rights are achieved are not adequately identified. This paper is a first step toward unbundling the black box of property rights into a formal and an informal component. We empirically determine the significance of both informal and formal rules in securing property rights. We find that when both components are included in the analysis, the impact of formal constraints is greatly diminished, while informal constraints are highly significant in explaining the security of property. These results are robust to a variety of model specifications, multiple instrumental variables, and a range of control variables

Reviews from LibraryThing.com:

Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.

Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Vol info	Copy number	Status	Notes	Date due	Barcode
Journal Article	Main Library - Special Collections	HB73 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Vol. 54, no.3 (pages 537-572)	SP12292	Not for loan	For In House Use Only

Browsing Main Library shelves, Shelving location: - Special Collections Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)

Previous	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	Next
Previous	HB73 JOU Do Patents Matter for Commercialization?	HB73 JOU Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: determinants of Cartel Duration	HB73 JOU Measuring the Compactness of Political Districting Plans	HB73 JOU Securing Private Property: formal versus Informal Institutions	HB73 JOU The Effects of Political Connections and State Ownership on Corporate Litigation in China	HB73 JOU Coming Clean and Cleaning Up: does Voluntary Self-Reporting Indicate Effective Self-Policing?	HB73 JOU Management Quality and Antitakeover Provisions	Next

Property rights are one of the most fundamental and highly robust institutions supporting economic performance. However, the channels through which property rights are achieved are not adequately identified. This paper is a first step toward unbundling the black box of property rights into a formal and an informal component. We empirically determine the significance of both informal and formal rules in securing property rights. We find that when both components are included in the analysis, the impact of formal constraints is greatly diminished, while informal constraints are highly significant in explaining the security of property. These results are robust to a variety of model specifications, multiple instrumental variables, and a range of control variables

There are no comments on this title.

to post a comment.

here