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Regulation and investment in network Industries: evidence from European telecoms by Michał Grajek and Lars-Hendrik Röller

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Journal of law and economics ; Volume 55, number 1Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 2012Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISSN:
  • 00222186
LOC classification:
  • HB73 JOU
Online resources: Summary: We provide evidence of an inherent trade-off between access regulation and investment incentives in telecommunications by using a comprehensive data set covering more than 70 fixed-line operators in 20 countries over 10 years. Our econometric model accommodates different investment incentives for incumbents and entrants, a strategic interaction of entrants’ and incumbents’ investments, and endogenous regulation. We find access regulation to have a negative effect on both total industry and individual carrier investment. Thus, promoting market entry by means of regulated access undermines incentives to invest in facilities-based competition. Moreover, we find evidence of a regulatory commitment problem: higher investments by incumbents encourage regulated access provision
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Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Vol info Copy number Status Notes Date due Barcode
Journal Article Journal Article Main Library - Special Collections HB73 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Vol. 55, no.1 (pages 189-216) SP12383 Not for loan For in house only

We provide evidence of an inherent trade-off between access regulation and investment incentives in telecommunications by using a comprehensive data set covering more than 70 fixed-line operators in 20 countries over 10 years. Our econometric model accommodates different investment incentives for incumbents and entrants, a strategic interaction of entrants’ and incumbents’ investments, and endogenous regulation. We find access regulation to have a negative effect on both total industry and individual carrier investment. Thus, promoting market entry by means of regulated access undermines incentives to invest in facilities-based competition. Moreover, we find evidence of a regulatory commitment problem: higher investments by incumbents encourage regulated access provision

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