Media versus special interests by Alexander Dyck, David Moss and Luigi Zingales

By:

Dyck, Alexander [author]

Contributor(s):

Material type: Text

TextSeries: The Journal of Law and Economics ; Volume 56, number 3Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 2013Content type:

text

Media type:

unmediated

Carrier type:

volume

Subject(s):

Media -- Public policy

LOC classification:

HB73 JOU

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Summary: We argue that profit-maximizing media help to overcome the rational ignorance problem highlighted by Anthony Downs. By collecting news and combining it with entertainment, media are able to inform passive voters about regulation and other public policy issues, acting as a (partial) counterbalance to small but well-organized groups. To show the impact this information has on regulation, we document the effect muckraking magazines had on the voting patterns of U.S. representatives and senators on regulatory issues in the early part of the twentieth century. We also discuss the conditions under which media can serve to counterbalance special interests.

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Vol info	Copy number	Status	Notes	Date due	Barcode
Journal Article	Main Library - Special Collections	HB73 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Vol. 56, no. 3 (pages 521-554)	SP17888	Not for loan	For in-house use only

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We argue that profit-maximizing media help to overcome the rational ignorance problem highlighted by Anthony Downs. By collecting news and combining it with entertainment, media are able to inform passive voters about regulation and other public policy issues, acting as a (partial) counterbalance to small but well-organized groups. To show the impact this information has on regulation, we document the effect muckraking magazines had on the voting patterns of U.S. representatives and senators on regulatory issues in the early part of the twentieth century. We also discuss the conditions under which media can serve to counterbalance special interests.

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