Midlands State University Library
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The political foundations of judicial Independence in dictatorship and democracy / created by Brad Epperly

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: Oxford : Oxford University Press, , 2019Copyright date: ©2019Description: 203 pages ; 24 cmContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISBN:
  • 9780198845027
Subject(s): LOC classification:
  • K3367 EPP
Contents:
Introduction1: The Expected Utility of Insurance2: The Mechanisms of Insurance3: Examining Insurance Across Regime Type4: Integrating de jure Independence5: Conclusion
Summary: Why do political actors tolerate courts able to check their power? This book argues that judicial independence as electorally-induced 'insurance' is about the risks of losing power, risks that are higher in autocratic regimes. Using a mixed-methods approach, it develops a theory of both de facto and de jure independence across regime type
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Includes bibliographical references and index.

Introduction1: The Expected Utility of Insurance2: The Mechanisms of Insurance3: Examining Insurance Across Regime Type4: Integrating de jure Independence5: Conclusion

Why do political actors tolerate courts able to check their power? This book argues that judicial independence as electorally-induced 'insurance' is about the risks of losing power, risks that are higher in autocratic regimes. Using a mixed-methods approach, it develops a theory of both de facto and de jure independence across regime type

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