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A note on cartel ringleaders and the corporate leniency programme

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Applied Economics Letters ; Volume , number ,New York Taylor & Francis 2013Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
Subject(s): Online resources: Summary: Cartel ringleaders can apply for amnesty in some jurisdictions (e.g., the EU), whereas in others they are excluded (e.g., the US). This note shows that ringleader exclusion loosens the incentive constraint of regular cartel members and tightens or loosens the incentive constraint of ringleaders. The latter may occur when the first firm that applies for leniency receives a sufficiently high discount.
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Item type Current library Call number Vol info Status Notes Date due Barcode
Journal Article Journal Article Main Library - Special Collections HB1.A666 APP (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Vol.20 , No.10 - 12 (Aug 2013) Not for loan For In House Use Only

Cartel ringleaders can apply for amnesty in some jurisdictions (e.g., the EU), whereas in others they are excluded (e.g., the US). This note shows that ringleader exclusion loosens the incentive constraint of regular cartel members and tightens or loosens the incentive constraint of ringleaders. The latter may occur when the first firm that applies for leniency receives a sufficiently high discount.

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