Hume’s Knave and Nonanthropocentric Virtues created by Paul Haught
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Item type | Current library | Call number | Vol info | Copy number | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | |
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Main Library - Special Collections | BJ52.5 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Vol 23. No 1-2 pages 129-143 | SP3460 | Not for loan | For Inhouse use only |
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This essay offers a critical assessment of environmental virtue ethics
(EVE). Finding an environmental ethical analogy with Hume’s critique of the
sensible knave, I argue that EVE is limited in much the same way as morality is on
the Humean view. Advocates of nonanthropocentrism will find it difficult to engage
those whose virtues comport them to anthropocentrism. Nonetheless, EVE is able to
ground confidence in nonanthropocentric virtues by explicating specific key virtues,
thereby holding open the possibility of bridging the motivational gap between
anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism.
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