The design of teacher incentive pay and educational outcomes: evidence from New York City bonus program/ created by Sarena Goodman F.

By:

Goodman, Sarena F [author]

Contributor(s):

Turner, Lesley J [co author]

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Journal of labor economics ; Volume 31 , number 1,part 1.Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013Content type:

text

Media type:

unmediated

Carrier type:

volume

ISSN:

0734306X

Subject(s):

Achievement gap -- Educational reform -- Economics of education

LOC classification:

HD5706 JOU

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Abstract: Teacher compensation schemes are often criticized for lacking a performance-based component. Proponents argue that teacher incentive pay can raise student achievement and stimulate system-wide innovation. We examine a group-based teacher incentive scheme implemented in New York City and investigate whether specific features of the program contributed to its ineffectiveness. Although overall the program had little effect on student achievement, we show that in schools where incentives to free ride were weakest, the program led to small increases in math achievement. Our results underscore the importance of carefully considering the design of teacher incentive pay programs.

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Vol info	Copy number	Status	Notes	Date due	Barcode
Journal Article	Main Library - Special Collections	HD5706 JOU (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Vol. 31, no. 2 (pages 409-420)	SP17580	Not for loan	For In-house use only

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Teacher compensation schemes are often criticized for lacking a performance-based component. Proponents argue that teacher incentive pay can raise student achievement and stimulate system-wide innovation. We examine a group-based teacher incentive scheme implemented in New York City and investigate whether specific features of the program contributed to its ineffectiveness. Although overall the program had little effect on student achievement, we show that in schools where incentives to free ride were weakest, the program led to small increases in math achievement. Our results underscore the importance of carefully considering the design of teacher incentive pay programs.

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