MARC details
000 -LEADER |
fixed length control field |
01919nam a22002417a 4500 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
control field |
ZW-GwMSU |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
control field |
20240415095032.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
fixed length control field |
240415b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER |
International Standard Serial Number |
09318658 |
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
Original cataloging agency |
MSU |
Language of cataloging |
English |
Transcribing agency |
MSU |
Description conventions |
rda |
050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
Classification number |
HB171.5 JOU |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Manduchi Agostino |
Relator term |
author |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
Title |
Non-neutral information costs with match-value uncertainty |
Statement of responsibility, etc. |
created by Agostino Manduchi |
264 1# - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE |
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture |
Heidelberg: |
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer |
Springer, |
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice |
2013 |
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE |
Source |
rdacontent |
Content type term |
text |
Content type code |
txt |
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
Source |
rdamedia |
Media type term |
unmediated |
Media type code |
n |
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE |
Source |
rdacarrier |
Carrier type term |
volume |
Carrier type code |
nc |
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
Title |
Journal of Economics |
Volume/sequential designation |
Volume 109, number 1 |
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. |
Summary, etc. |
This paper investigates a model featuring a monopolist seller and a buyer with an uncertain valuation for the seller’s product. The seller chooses an information system which allows the buyer to receive a private signal, potentially correlated with her valuation. No restrictions are imposed on the conditional distributions of the signal; the cost of the information system is proportional to its precision, measured by the mutual information between the distributions of the buyer’s valuation and the signal. In equilibrium, the information system trades off the information cost against the losses deriving from a probability of trade that is either “too high,” or “too low”—depending on the relative weight of the expected losses resulting from errors of the two types—and sends “non-neutral” signals, typically. Thus, in general, the probability of a correct signal depends on the buyer’s actual valuation, and the probability of trade differs from the probability of a valuation exceeding the cost of production. The expected total surplus generated by the exchange is maximized, in equilibrium. |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Match-value |
Form subdivision |
Information provision |
General subdivision |
Mutual information and Bayesian learning |
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
Uniform Resource Identifier |
10.1007/s00712-012-0283-7 |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Library of Congress Classification |
Koha item type |
Journal Article |