Midlands State University Library

Assortative matching of risk-averse agents with endogenous risk (Record no. 164860)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01536nam a22002657a 4500
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field ZW-GwMSU
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20240415084257.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 240415b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER
International Standard Serial Number 09318658
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency MSU
Language of cataloging English
Transcribing agency MSU
Description conventions rda
050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number HB171.5 JOU
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Li Sanxi
Relator term author
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Assortative matching of risk-averse agents with endogenous risk
Statement of responsibility, etc. created by Sanxi Li, Hailin Sun and Pu Chen
264 1# - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture Heidelberg:
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer Springer,
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice 2013
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE
Source rdacontent
Content type term text
Content type code txt
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE
Source rdamedia
Media type term unmediated
Media type code n
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE
Source rdacarrier
Carrier type term volume
Carrier type code nc
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE
Title Journal of Economics
Volume/sequential designation Volume 109, number 1
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. A standard risk-sharing matching game predicts negative assortative matching over agents’ risk attitudes. In regards to risk sharing, less risk-averse agents prefer highly risk-averse partners, who pay a high risk premium. Negative sorting is, however, inconsistent with empirical and experimental literature. To resolve this conflict, we propose a model where agents can control the risks to their incomes. In regards to risk management, agents prefer similar partners because of their aligned objectives in risk management. When it is easy to control risks or all agents are sufficiently risk-averse, the risk-management effect dominates, leading to positive sorting.
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Assortative matching
Form subdivision Efficient risk sharing
General subdivision Endogenous risk
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Hailin Sun
Relator term co-author
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Pu Chen
Relator term co-author
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier 10.1007/s00712-012-0323-3
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme Library of Congress Classification
Koha item type Journal Article
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Shelving location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Total Checkouts Full call number Date last seen Copy number Price effective from Koha item type Public note
    Library of Congress Classification     Main Library Main Library - Special Collections 01/09/2014 Vol. 109, no. 1 (pages 27-40)   HB171.5 JOU 15/04/2024 SP20885 15/04/2024 Journal Article For In house Use