MARC details
| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01705nam a22002537a 4500 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
|---|
| control field |
ZW-GwMSU |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
|---|
| control field |
20240402130930.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
240402b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER |
|---|
| International Standard Serial Number |
09382259 |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
|---|
| Original cataloging agency |
MSU |
| Language of cataloging |
English |
| Transcribing agency |
MSU |
| Description conventions |
rda |
| 050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
|---|
| Classification number |
HB119 ECO |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Ivanov, Maxim |
| Relator term |
author |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Information revelation in competitive markets |
| Statement of responsibility, etc. |
created by Maxim Ivanov |
| 264 1# - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE |
|---|
| Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture |
Berlin |
| Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer |
Springer, |
| Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice |
2013. |
| 336 ## - CONTENT TYPE |
|---|
| Source |
rdacontent |
| Content type term |
text |
| Content type code |
txt |
| 337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
|---|
| Source |
rdamedia |
| Media type term |
unmediated |
| Media type code |
n |
| 338 ## - CARRIER TYPE |
|---|
| Source |
rdacarrier |
| Carrier type term |
volume |
| Carrier type code |
nc |
| 440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
|---|
| Title |
Economic theory |
| Volume/sequential designation |
Volume 52, number 1 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
This paper analyzes a market with multiple sellers and horizontally differentiated products. We investigate the sellers’ incentives to reveal product relevant information that affects the buyer’s private valuation. The main finding is that if the number of sellers is sufficiently large, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium with full information disclosure. Thus, unlike the results by Lewis and Sappington (Int Econ Rev 35:309–327, <CitationRef CitationID="CR18">1994</CitationRef>) and Johnson and Myatt (Am Econ Rev 93:756–784, <CitationRef CitationID="CR16">2006</CitationRef>) for monopoly, which state that the monopolist reveals either full information or no information, intense competition results in a single extreme with respect to information disclosure. We show that the market is always inefficient, but the magnitude of inefficiency converges to zero at a high rate as competition intensifies. |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Information revelation |
| Form subdivision |
Competition |
| General subdivision |
Market |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Differentiated products |
| 856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
|---|
| Uniform Resource Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0629-3 |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Library of Congress Classification |
| Koha item type |
Journal Article |