MARC details
| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01525nam a22002657a 4500 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
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| control field |
ZW-GwMSU |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
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| control field |
20240402125548.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
240402b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER |
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| International Standard Serial Number |
09382259 |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
|---|
| Original cataloging agency |
MSU |
| Language of cataloging |
English |
| Transcribing agency |
MSU |
| Description conventions |
rda |
| 050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
|---|
| Classification number |
HB119 ECO |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Moreno, Diego |
| Relator term |
author |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods |
| Statement of responsibility, etc. |
created by Diego Moreno and María José Moscoso |
| 264 1# - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE |
|---|
| Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture |
Berlini: |
| Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer |
Springer, |
| Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice |
2013. |
| 336 ## - CONTENT TYPE |
|---|
| Source |
rdacontent |
| Content type term |
text |
| Content type code |
txt |
| 337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
|---|
| Source |
rdamedia |
| Media type term |
unmediated |
| Media type code |
n |
| 338 ## - CARRIER TYPE |
|---|
| Source |
rdacarrier |
| Carrier type term |
volume |
| Carrier type code |
nc |
| 440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
|---|
| Title |
Economic theory |
| Volume/sequential designation |
Volume 52, number 1 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
We show that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods are dictatorial—i.e., they always select an allocation in their range that maximizes the welfare of the same single individual (the dictator). Further, strategy-proof and efficient allocation mechanisms are strongly dictatorial—i.e., they select the dictator's preferred allocation on the entire feasible set. Thus, our results reveal the extent to which the conflict between individual incentives and other properties that may be deemed desirable (e.g., fairness, equal treatment, distributive justice) pervades resource allocation problems. |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Allocation mechanisms |
| Form subdivision |
Public goods |
| General subdivision |
Strategy-proofness |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Dictatorship |
| General subdivision |
Efficiency |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Moscoso, María José |
| Relator term |
co author |
| 856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
|---|
| Uniform Resource Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0627-5 |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Library of Congress Classification |
| Koha item type |
Journal Article |