MARC details
| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01741nam a22002537a 4500 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
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| control field |
ZW-GwMSU |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
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| control field |
20240402103129.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
240402b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER |
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| International Standard Serial Number |
0938229 |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
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| Original cataloging agency |
MSU |
| Language of cataloging |
English |
| Transcribing agency |
MSU |
| Description conventions |
rda |
| 050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
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| Classification number |
HB119 ECO |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Virág, Gábor |
| Relator term |
author |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders |
| Statement of responsibility, etc. |
created by Gábor Virág |
| 264 1# - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE |
|---|
| Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture |
Berlin: |
| Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer |
Springer, |
| Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice |
2013. |
| 336 ## - CONTENT TYPE |
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| Source |
rdacontent |
| Content type term |
text |
| Content type code |
txt |
| 337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
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| Source |
rdamedia |
| Media type term |
unmediated |
| Media type code |
n |
| 338 ## - CARRIER TYPE |
|---|
| Source |
rdacarrier |
| Carrier type term |
volume |
| Carrier type code |
nc |
| 440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
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| Title |
Economic theory |
| Volume/sequential designation |
Volume 52, number 1 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc. |
We study first-price auctions with resale when there are many bidders and derive existence and characterization results under the assumption that the winner of the initial auction runs a second-price auction with an optimal reserve price. The fact that symmetrization fails when there are more than two bidders has been observed before, but we also provide the direction: weaker bidders are less likely to win than stronger ones. For a special class of distributions and three bidders, we prove that the bid distributions are more symmetric with resale than without. Numerical simulations suggest that the more bidders there are, the more similar the allocation is to the case without resale, and thus, the more asymmetric the bid distributions are between strong and weak bidders. We also show in an example that the revenue advantage of first-price auctions over second-price auctions is positive, but decreasing in the number of bidders. |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
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| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Auctions |
| Form subdivision |
Resale |
| General subdivision |
Incomplete information |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Dynamic market interaction |
| 856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
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| Uniform Resource Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0666-y |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Library of Congress Classification |
| Koha item type |
Journal Article |