Midlands State University Library

Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition (Record no. 164547)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01829nam a22002657a 4500
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field ZW-GwMSU
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20240404074320.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 240326b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER
International Standard Serial Number 09382259
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency MSU
Language of cataloging English
Transcribing agency MSU
Description conventions rda
050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number HB119 ECO
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Dickson, Alex
Relator term author
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition
Statement of responsibility, etc. by Alex Dickson & Roger Hartley
264 1# - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture Berlin:
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer Springer,
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice 2013.
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE
Source rdacontent
Content type term text
Content type code txt
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE
Source rdamedia
Media type term unmediated
Media type code n
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE
Source rdacarrier
Carrier type term volume
Carrier type code nc
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE
Title Economic theory
Volume/sequential designation Volume 52, number 3
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Bilateral oligopoly is a market game with two commodities, allowing strategic behavior on both sides of the market. When the number of buyers is large, bilateral oligopoly approximates a game of quantity competition played by sellers. We present examples which show that this is not typically a Cournot game. Rather, we introduce an alternative game of quantity competition (the market share game) and, appealing to results in the literature on contests, show that this yields the same equilibria as the many-buyer limit of bilateral oligopoly, under standard assumptions on costs and preferences. We also show that the market share and Cournot games have the same equilibria if and only if the price elasticity of the latter is one and investigate the differences in equilibria otherwise. These results lead to necessary and sufficient conditions for the Cournot game to be a good approximation to bilateral oligopoly with many buyers and to an ordering of total output when they are not satisfied.
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Quantity competition
Form subdivision Cournot
General subdivision Strategic foundation
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Commitment
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Hartley, Roger
Relator term co author
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0676-9
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme Library of Congress Classification
Koha item type Journal Article
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Shelving location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Total Checkouts Full call number Date last seen Copy number Price effective from Koha item type Public note
    Library of Congress Classification     Main Library Main Library - Special Collections 12/09/2014 vol. 52, no. 3 (pages 979-1004)   HB119 ECO 26/03/2024 SP21293 26/03/2024 Journal Article For In house Use
    Library of Congress Classification     Main Library Main Library - Special Collections 04/09/2014 Vol. 52, no.3 (pages 979-1004)   HB119 ECO 04/04/2024 SP21041 04/04/2024 Journal Article For In house Use