MARC details
| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01786nam a22002537a 4500 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
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| control field |
ZW-GwMSU |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
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| control field |
20240403074853.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
240325b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER |
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| International Standard Serial Number |
0938225 |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
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| Original cataloging agency |
MSU |
| Transcribing agency |
MSU |
| Description conventions |
rda |
| Language of cataloging |
English |
| 050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
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| Classification number |
HB119 ECO |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz |
| Relator term |
author |
| 245 14 - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets |
| Statement of responsibility, etc. |
creaated by Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan |
| 264 1# - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE |
|---|
| Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture |
Berlin: |
| Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer |
Springer, |
| Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice |
2013. |
| 336 ## - CONTENT TYPE |
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| Source |
rdacontent |
| Content type term |
text |
| Content type code |
txt |
| 337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
|---|
| Source |
rdamedia |
| Media type term |
unmediated |
| Media type code |
n |
| 338 ## - CARRIER TYPE |
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| Source |
rdacarrier |
| Carrier type term |
volume |
| Carrier type code |
nc |
| 440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
|---|
| Volume/sequential designation |
Volume 53, number 1 |
| Title |
Economic theory |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
We study the welfare effects of different types of pre-arrangements (as identified in Sönmez in J Econ Theory 86:148–156, 1999) under the intern-optimal and hospital-optimal stable mechanisms in matching markets. First, both mechanisms are manipulable via Type-2 pre-arrangements. Regarding the welfare consequences, they might cause inefficient outcomes to arise, and the welfare effects on each side are ambiguous in the sense that there might be agents from each side, apart from pre-arranging ones, being better and worse off. Then, for Type-1 pre-arrangements, due to Kojima and Pathak (Am Econ Rev 99(3):608–627, 2009), we know that the intern-optimal stable mechanism is immune to this type of manipulations. In contrast to this result, the hospital-optimal stable mechanism turns out to be manipulable. More interestingly, they do not result in inefficient outcomes, and the welfare effects on each side are unambiguous: All hospitals (interns) are better (worse) off. |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Unraveling |
| Form subdivision |
Pre-arrangement |
| General subdivision |
Welfare |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Matching |
| General subdivision |
Stability |
| 856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
|---|
| Uniform Resource Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0695-1 |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Library of Congress Classification |
| Koha item type |
Journal Article |