Midlands State University Library

Comparison of equilibrium actions and payoffs across players in games of strategic complements (Record no. 164498)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01492nam a22002537a 4500
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field ZW-GwMSU
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20240402071817.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 240322b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER
International Standard Serial Number 0938-2259
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency MSU
Language of cataloging English
Transcribing agency MSU
Description conventions rda
050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number HB119 ECO
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Lazzati, Natalia
Relator term author
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Comparison of equilibrium actions and payoffs across players in games of strategic complements
Statement of responsibility, etc. created by Natalia Lazzati
264 1# - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture Heildelberg :
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer Springer,
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice 2013
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE
Source rdacontent
Content type term text
Content type code txt
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE
Source rdamedia
Media type term unmediated
Media type code n
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE
Source rdacarrier
Carrier type term volume
Carrier type code nc
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE
Title Economic theory
Volume/sequential designation Volume 54, number 3
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. This paper provides sufficient conditions for comparing the choices of different players in games of strategic complements. The main results require a weak ordering relation on the best responses of players in the game and their constraint sets. Under additional restrictions, we can also compare their relative payoffs. We offer three applications of our idea to industrial organization and new models of behavioral economics. Specifically, we study horizontal mergers in oligopolies, competition among firms with differentiated demands and costs of production, and a model of biased perceptions
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Equilibrium
Form subdivision Payoffs
General subdivision Strategic complements
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Quasisupermodular games
Form subdivision Asymmetric equilibria
General subdivision Single-crossing property
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0736-9
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme Library of Congress Classification
Koha item type Journal Article
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Shelving location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Total Checkouts Full call number Date last seen Copy number Price effective from Koha item type Public note
    Library of Congress Classification     Main Library Main Library - Special Collections 04/09/2014 vol. 54, no. 3 (pages 777-788)   HB119 ECO 22/03/2024 SP21040 22/03/2024 Journal Article For in house use
    Library of Congress Classification     Main Library Main Library - Special Collections 12/09/2017 Vol. 54, no. 3 (pages 777-788)   HB119 ECO 02/04/2024 SP21289 02/04/2024 Journal Article For In House Use Only