MARC details
| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01660nam a22002777a 4500 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
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| control field |
ZW-GwMSU |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
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| control field |
20240402073026.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
240322b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER |
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| International Standard Serial Number |
0938-2259 |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
|---|
| Original cataloging agency |
MSU |
| Language of cataloging |
English |
| Transcribing agency |
MSU |
| Description conventions |
rda |
| 050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
|---|
| Classification number |
HB119 ECO |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Desgranges, Gabriel |
| Relator term |
author |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Asymmetric information and rationalizability |
| Statement of responsibility, etc. |
created by Gabriel Desgranges & Stéphane Gauthier |
| 264 1# - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE |
|---|
| Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture |
Heildelberg: |
| Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer |
Springer, |
| Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice |
2013. |
| 336 ## - CONTENT TYPE |
|---|
| Source |
rdacontent |
| Content type term |
text |
| Content type code |
txt |
| 337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
|---|
| Source |
rdamedia |
| Media type term |
unmediated |
| Media type code |
n |
| 338 ## - CARRIER TYPE |
|---|
| Source |
rdacarrier |
| Carrier type term |
volume |
| Carrier type code |
nc |
| 440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
|---|
| Volume/sequential designation |
Volume 54, number 3 |
| Title |
Economic theory |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
We study how asymmetric information affects the set of rationalizable solutions in a linear setup where the outcome is determined by forecasts about this same outcome. The unique rational expectations equilibrium is also the unique rationalizable solution when the sensitivity of the outcome to agents’ forecasts is less than one, provided that this sensitivity is common knowledge. Relaxing this common knowledge assumption, multiple rationalizable solutions arise when the proportion of agents who know the sensitivity is large, and the uninformed agents believe it is possible that the sensitivity is greater than one. Instability is equivalent to existence of some kind of sunspot equilibria. |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
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| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Asymmetric information |
| General subdivision |
Rationalizability |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Asymmetric information |
| Form subdivision |
Common knowledge |
| General subdivision |
Eductive learning |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Rational expectations |
| General subdivision |
Rationalizability |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Gauthier, Stéphane |
| Relator term |
co author |
| 856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
|---|
| Uniform Resource Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0731-1 |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Library of Congress Classification |
| Koha item type |
Journal Article |