Information acquisition and welfare effect in a model of competitive financial markets (Record no. 164458)
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fixed length control field | 01657nam a22002537a 4500 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
control field | ZW-GwMSU |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
control field | 20240319141952.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
fixed length control field | 240319b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER | |
International Standard Serial Number | 0938-2259 |
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE | |
Original cataloging agency | MSU |
Language of cataloging | English |
Transcribing agency | MSU |
Description conventions | rda |
050 ## - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER | |
Classification number | HB119 ECO |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | Hu, Xiaojuan |
Relator term | author |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | Information acquisition and welfare effect in a model of competitive financial markets |
Statement of responsibility, etc. | by Xiaojuan Hu & Cheng-Zhong Qin |
264 1# - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE | |
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture | Heildelberg : |
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer | Springer, |
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice | 2013 |
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE | |
Source | rdacontent |
Content type term | text |
Content type code | txt |
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE | |
Source | rdamedia |
Media type term | unmediated |
Media type code | n |
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE | |
Source | rdacarrier |
Carrier type term | volume |
Carrier type code | nc |
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE | |
Title | Economic theory |
Volume/sequential designation | Volume 54, number 1 |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | We analyze welfare effect of information acquisition for a model of competitive financial markets with diverse information and rational expectations. We show that in the fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium, each agent’s gain from trade in ex ante utility decreases as more agents become informed. An implication of the result is that market efficiency and ex ante Pareto optimality are not compatible in competitive financial markets with diverse information and rational expectations. Our result can be viewed as complementary to the Grossman paradox, which shows that market efficiency and individuals’ incentives to acquire information are not compatible. This paper is the first step in a projected exploration of welfare effect of information acquisition in models with diverse information. |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
Topical term or geographic name entry element | Information acquisition |
Form subdivision | Welfare effect |
General subdivision | Financial markets |
700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | Qin, Cheng-Zhong |
Relator term | co-author |
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
Uniform Resource Identifier | 10.1007/s00199-012-0711-5 |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
Source of classification or shelving scheme | Library of Congress Classification |
Koha item type | Journal Article |
Withdrawn status | Lost status | Source of classification or shelving scheme | Damaged status | Not for loan | Home library | Current library | Shelving location | Date acquired | Serial Enumeration / chronology | Total Checkouts | Full call number | Date last seen | Copy number | Price effective from | Koha item type | Public note |
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Library of Congress Classification | Main Library | Main Library | - Special Collections | 04/09/2014 | vol. 54, no. 1 (pages 199-210) | HB119 ECO | 19/03/2024 | SP21036 | 19/03/2024 | Journal Article | For In house Use |