MARC details
| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
02322nam a22002537a 4500 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
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| control field |
ZW-GwMSU |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
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| control field |
20240319130724.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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240319b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
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| Original cataloging agency |
MSU |
| Language of cataloging |
English |
| Transcribing agency |
MSU |
| Description conventions |
rda |
| 050 ## - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
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| Classification number |
HB119 ECO |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Britz, Volker |
| Relator term |
author |
| 245 12 - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
A bargaining theory of the firm |
| Statement of responsibility, etc. |
by Volker Britz, P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski |
| 264 1# - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE |
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| Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture |
Heildelberg : |
| Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer |
Springer, |
| Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice |
2013 |
| 336 ## - CONTENT TYPE |
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| Source |
rdacontent |
| Content type term |
text |
| Content type code |
txt |
| 337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
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| Source |
rdamedia |
| Media type term |
unmediated |
| Media type code |
n |
| 338 ## - CARRIER TYPE |
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| Source |
rdacarrier |
| Carrier type term |
volume |
| Carrier type code |
nc |
| 440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
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| Title |
Economic theory |
| Volume/sequential designation |
Volume 54, number 1 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc. |
Suppose that a firm has several owners and that the future is uncertain in the sense that one out of many different states of nature will realize tomorrow. An owner’s time preference and risk attitude will determine the importance he places on payoffs in the different states. It is a well-known problem in the literature that under incomplete asset markets, a conflict about the firm’s objective function tends to arise among its owners. In this paper, we take a new approach to this problem, which is based on non-cooperative bargaining. The owners of the firm play a bargaining game in order to choose the firm’s production plan and a scheme of transfers which are payable before the uncertainty about the future state of nature is resolved. We analyze the resulting firm decision in the limit of subgame-perfect equilibria in stationary strategies. Given the distribution of bargaining power, we obtain a unique prediction for a production plan and a transfer scheme. When markets are complete, the production plan chosen corresponds to the profit-maximizing production plan as in the Arrow–Debreu model. Contrary to that model, owners typically do use transfers to redistribute profits. When markets are incomplete, the production plan chosen is almost always different from the one in a transfer-free Drèze (pseudo-)equilibrium and again owners use transfers to redistribute profits. Nevertheless, our results do support the Drèze criterion as the appropriate objective function of the firm. |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
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| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Bargaining theory |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques |
| Relator term |
co-author |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Predtetchinski, Arkadi |
| Relator term |
co-author |
| 856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
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| Uniform Resource Identifier |
10.1007/s00199-012-0721-3 |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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| Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Library of Congress Classification |
| Koha item type |
Journal Article |