MARC details
| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01928nam a22002657a 4500 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
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| control field |
ZW-GwMSU |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
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| control field |
20240318130432.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
240318b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER |
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| International Standard Serial Number |
00222186 |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
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| Original cataloging agency |
MSU |
| Language of cataloging |
English |
| Transcribing agency |
MSU |
| Description conventions |
rda |
| 050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
|---|
| Classification number |
HB73 JOU |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Ben Basaṭ, Avi |
| Relator term |
author |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Conflicts, interest groups, and politics in structural reforms |
| Statement of responsibility, etc. |
created by Avi Ben-Bassat |
| 264 1# - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE |
|---|
| Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture |
Chicago: |
| Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer |
University of Chicago Press, |
| Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice |
2011. |
| 336 ## - CONTENT TYPE |
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| Source |
rdacontent |
| Content type term |
text |
| Content type code |
txt |
| 337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
|---|
| Source |
rdamedia |
| Media type term |
unmediated |
| Media type code |
n |
| 338 ## - CARRIER TYPE |
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| Source |
rdacarrier |
| Carrier type term |
volume |
| Carrier type code |
nc |
| 440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
|---|
| Title |
Journal of Law and Economics |
| Volume/sequential designation |
Volume 54, number 4, part 1 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
The present study is, to my knowledge, the first to examine the balance of power among all players influencing the adoption of structural reforms: politicians, regulators, and interest groups. Special attention is devoted to the effect of conflicts between regulators. Professional conflicts signal to politicians that there is a high level of risk in implementing a given reform, thereby weakening their confidence in it. Conflicts also benefit interest groups, increasing their effectiveness vis-à-vis politicians. Using a unique data set on 32 attempts to reform Israel’s financial market, I find that the greater the extent of conflicts among regulators and the greater the intensity of the opposition of interest groups, the lower the probability that a reform will be approved. These conflicts, together with the strength of interest groups, have led to repeated attempts to introduce reforms, so that it takes, on average, 10 years for a reform to be adopted |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
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| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Banking reforms |
| Form subdivision |
Economic reform |
| General subdivision |
Financial markets |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Government intervention |
| Form subdivision |
Government reform |
| General subdivision |
Macroeconomic reform |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Political interest groups |
| Form subdivision |
Political reform |
| General subdivision |
Politicians |
| 856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
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| Uniform Resource Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.1086/658672 |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Library of Congress Classification |
| Koha item type |
Journal Article |