Efficiency versus optimality in procurement (Record no. 164415)
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fixed length control field | 01764nam a22002297a 4500 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
control field | ZW-GwMSU |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
control field | 20240318123907.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
fixed length control field | 240318b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE | |
Original cataloging agency | MSU |
Language of cataloging | English |
Transcribing agency | MSU |
Description conventions | rda |
050 ## - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER | |
Classification number | HB119 ECO |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | Postl, Peter |
Relator term | author |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | Efficiency versus optimality in procurement |
Statement of responsibility, etc. | by Peter Postl |
264 1# - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE | |
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture | Heildelberg : |
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer | Springer, |
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice | 2013 |
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE | |
Source | rdacontent |
Content type term | text |
Content type code | txt |
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE | |
Source | rdamedia |
Media type term | unmediated |
Media type code | n |
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE | |
Source | rdacarrier |
Carrier type term | volume |
Carrier type code | nc |
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE | |
Title | Economic Theory |
Volume/sequential designation | Volume 53, number 2 |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | We study procurement procedures that simultaneously determine the specification and price of a good. Suppliers can offer and produce the good in either of two possible specifications, both of which are equally good for the buyer. Production costs are interdependent and unknown at the time of bidding. Each supplier receives two signals about production cost, one per specification. Our model is a special case of the interdependent value settings with multidimensional types in Jehiel and Moldovanu (Econometrica 69:1237-1259, 2001) where an efficient and incentive compatible mechanism exists. We characterize equilibrium bidding behavior if the winning supplier is selected purely on the basis of price, regardless of the specification offered. While there is a positive chance of obtaining an inefficient specification, this procurement mechanism involves lower information rents than efficient mechanisms, suggesting that there is a trade-off between minimizing expected expenditure for the good, and ensuring that the efficient specification is chosen |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
Topical term or geographic name entry element | Business and Economics |
Form subdivision | Economic Theory |
General subdivision | Procurement |
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
Uniform Resource Identifier | 10.1007/s00199-012-0699-x |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
Source of classification or shelving scheme | Library of Congress Classification |
Koha item type | Journal Article |
Withdrawn status | Lost status | Source of classification or shelving scheme | Damaged status | Not for loan | Home library | Current library | Shelving location | Date acquired | Serial Enumeration / chronology | Total Checkouts | Full call number | Date last seen | Copy number | Price effective from | Koha item type | Public note |
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Library of Congress Classification | Main Library | Main Library | - Special Collections | 18/03/2024 | vol. 53, no. 2 (pages 403-424) | HB119 ECO | 18/03/2024 | SP21037 | 18/03/2024 | Journal Article | For In house Use |