Midlands State University Library

Efficiency versus optimality in procurement (Record no. 164415)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01764nam a22002297a 4500
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field ZW-GwMSU
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20240318123907.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 240318b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency MSU
Language of cataloging English
Transcribing agency MSU
Description conventions rda
050 ## - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number HB119 ECO
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Postl, Peter
Relator term author
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Efficiency versus optimality in procurement
Statement of responsibility, etc. by Peter Postl
264 1# - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture Heildelberg :
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer Springer,
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice 2013
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE
Source rdacontent
Content type term text
Content type code txt
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE
Source rdamedia
Media type term unmediated
Media type code n
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE
Source rdacarrier
Carrier type term volume
Carrier type code nc
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE
Title Economic Theory
Volume/sequential designation Volume 53, number 2
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. We study procurement procedures that simultaneously determine the specification and price of a good. Suppliers can offer and produce the good in either of two possible specifications, both of which are equally good for the buyer. Production costs are interdependent and unknown at the time of bidding. Each supplier receives two signals about production cost, one per specification. Our model is a special case of the interdependent value settings with multidimensional types in Jehiel and Moldovanu (Econometrica 69:1237-1259, 2001) where an efficient and incentive compatible mechanism exists. We characterize equilibrium bidding behavior if the winning supplier is selected purely on the basis of price, regardless of the specification offered. While there is a positive chance of obtaining an inefficient specification, this procurement mechanism involves lower information rents than efficient mechanisms, suggesting that there is a trade-off between minimizing expected expenditure for the good, and ensuring that the efficient specification is chosen
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Business and Economics
Form subdivision Economic Theory
General subdivision Procurement
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier 10.1007/s00199-012-0699-x
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme Library of Congress Classification
Koha item type Journal Article
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Shelving location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Total Checkouts Full call number Date last seen Copy number Price effective from Koha item type Public note
    Library of Congress Classification     Main Library Main Library - Special Collections 18/03/2024 vol. 53, no. 2 (pages 403-424)   HB119 ECO 18/03/2024 SP21037 18/03/2024 Journal Article For In house Use