Midlands State University Library

Elected versus appointed policy makers: (Record no. 164368)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01551nam a22002657a 4500
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field ZW-GwMSU
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20240318133129.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 240315b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER
International Standard Serial Number 00222186
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency MSU
Language of cataloging English
Transcribing agency MSU
Description conventions rda
050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number HB73 JOU
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Whalley, Alexander
Relator term author
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Elected versus appointed policy makers:
Remainder of title evidence from city treasurers
Statement of responsibility, etc. created by Alexander Whalley
264 1# - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture Chicago:
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer University of Chicago Press,
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice 2013.
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE
Source rdacontent
Content type term text
Content type code txt
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE
Source rdamedia
Media type term unmediated
Media type code n
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE
Source rdacarrier
Carrier type term volume
Carrier type code nc
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE
Title Journal of Law and Economics
Volume/sequential designation Volume 56, number 1
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. This paper investigates whether the method of selecting public officials affects policy making. I compare the policy choices of bureaucrat city treasurers and politician city treasurers, who are selected and held accountable in very different ways. The analysis draws on rich data from California to examine whether cities with appointed or elected city treasurers pay lower costs to borrow. The results demonstrate that having appointive treasurers reduces a city’s cost of borrowing by 19-31 percent. Holding officials directly accountable to voters can result in lower levels of performance in complex policy areas
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Cities
Form subdivision City politics
General subdivision Cost efficiency
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Debt management
Form subdivision Fiscal policy
General subdivision Municipal governments
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Political institutions
Form subdivision Politicians
General subdivision Referendums
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier https://doi.org/10.1086/668696
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme Library of Congress Classification
Koha item type Journal Article
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Shelving location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Total Checkouts Full call number Date last seen Copy number Price effective from Koha item type Public note
    Library of Congress Classification     Main Library Main Library - Special Collections 26/11/2013 Vol. 55, no.1 (pages 39-82)   HB73 JOU 15/03/2024 SP17578 15/03/2024 Journal Article For In House Use Only