MARC details
000 -LEADER |
fixed length control field |
01551nam a22002657a 4500 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
control field |
ZW-GwMSU |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
control field |
20240318133129.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
fixed length control field |
240315b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER |
International Standard Serial Number |
00222186 |
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
Original cataloging agency |
MSU |
Language of cataloging |
English |
Transcribing agency |
MSU |
Description conventions |
rda |
050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
Classification number |
HB73 JOU |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Whalley, Alexander |
Relator term |
author |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
Title |
Elected versus appointed policy makers: |
Remainder of title |
evidence from city treasurers |
Statement of responsibility, etc. |
created by Alexander Whalley |
264 1# - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE |
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture |
Chicago: |
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer |
University of Chicago Press, |
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice |
2013. |
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE |
Source |
rdacontent |
Content type term |
text |
Content type code |
txt |
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
Source |
rdamedia |
Media type term |
unmediated |
Media type code |
n |
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE |
Source |
rdacarrier |
Carrier type term |
volume |
Carrier type code |
nc |
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
Title |
Journal of Law and Economics |
Volume/sequential designation |
Volume 56, number 1 |
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. |
Summary, etc. |
This paper investigates whether the method of selecting public officials affects policy making. I compare the policy choices of bureaucrat city treasurers and politician city treasurers, who are selected and held accountable in very different ways. The analysis draws on rich data from California to examine whether cities with appointed or elected city treasurers pay lower costs to borrow. The results demonstrate that having appointive treasurers reduces a city’s cost of borrowing by 19-31 percent. Holding officials directly accountable to voters can result in lower levels of performance in complex policy areas |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Cities |
Form subdivision |
City politics |
General subdivision |
Cost efficiency |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Debt management |
Form subdivision |
Fiscal policy |
General subdivision |
Municipal governments |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Political institutions |
Form subdivision |
Politicians |
General subdivision |
Referendums |
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
Uniform Resource Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.1086/668696 |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Library of Congress Classification |
Koha item type |
Journal Article |