Midlands State University Library

Antitrust in the not‐for‐profit sector/ (Record no. 164317)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01984nam a22002657a 4500
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field ZW-GwMSU
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20240318080331.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 240313b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency MSU
Language of cataloging English
Transcribing agency MSU
Description conventions rda
050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number HB73 JOU
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Philipson, Tomas J.
Relator term author
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Antitrust in the not‐for‐profit sector/
Statement of responsibility, etc. created by Tomas J. Philipson and Richard A. Posner
264 ## - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture Chicago :
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer University of Chicago Press,
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice 2009.
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE
Source rdacontent
Content type term text
Content type code txt
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE
Source rdamedia
Media type term unmediated
Media type code n
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE
Source rdacarrier
Carrier type term volume
Carrier type code nc
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE
Title Journal of Law and Economics
Volume/sequential designation Volume 52, number 1
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Although the not‐for‐profit sector contributes greatly to aggregate output in many industries, there has been little explicit analysis of the economic consequences of applying antitrust policy in this sector. Despite the differences between for‐profit and nonprofit firms stressed in conventional economic analyses, U.S. antitrust law generally does not distinguish between these two organizational forms. This paper argues that, under plausible assumptions and with possible exceptions, the same incentives to restrain trade exist in the nonprofit sector as in the for‐profit sector. Altruistic firms benefit from exploiting market power, even when they would price below cost in the absence of competition. In fact, the efficiency gains from antitrust policy may often be larger for nonprofit firms. Therefore, a policy of promoting competition has social value even when producers’ motivations are altruistic. The argument for uniform antitrust treatment of the two sectors extends to exemptions from antitrust law as well
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Altruism
Form subdivision Antitrust
General subdivision Cost efficiency
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Economic competition
Form subdivision Industrial market
General subdivision Industrial output
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Marginal costs
Form subdivision Market power
General subdivision Market prices
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Posner, Richard A.
Relator term co author
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier https://doi.org/10.1086/589704
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme Library of Congress Classification
Koha item type Journal Article
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Shelving location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Total Checkouts Full call number Date last seen Copy number Price effective from Koha item type Public note
    Library of Congress Classification     Main Library Main Library - Special Collections 20/07/2010 Vol. 52, no.1 (pages 1-18)   HB73 JOU 13/03/2024 SP4271 13/03/2024 Journal Article For In House Use Only