MARC details
000 -LEADER |
fixed length control field |
01984nam a22002657a 4500 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
control field |
ZW-GwMSU |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
control field |
20240318080331.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
fixed length control field |
240313b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
Original cataloging agency |
MSU |
Language of cataloging |
English |
Transcribing agency |
MSU |
Description conventions |
rda |
050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
Classification number |
HB73 JOU |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Philipson, Tomas J. |
Relator term |
author |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
Title |
Antitrust in the not‐for‐profit sector/ |
Statement of responsibility, etc. |
created by Tomas J. Philipson and Richard A. Posner |
264 ## - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE |
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture |
Chicago : |
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer |
University of Chicago Press, |
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice |
2009. |
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE |
Source |
rdacontent |
Content type term |
text |
Content type code |
txt |
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
Source |
rdamedia |
Media type term |
unmediated |
Media type code |
n |
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE |
Source |
rdacarrier |
Carrier type term |
volume |
Carrier type code |
nc |
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
Title |
Journal of Law and Economics |
Volume/sequential designation |
Volume 52, number 1 |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
Summary, etc. |
Although the not‐for‐profit sector contributes greatly to aggregate output in many industries, there has been little explicit analysis of the economic consequences of applying antitrust policy in this sector. Despite the differences between for‐profit and nonprofit firms stressed in conventional economic analyses, U.S. antitrust law generally does not distinguish between these two organizational forms. This paper argues that, under plausible assumptions and with possible exceptions, the same incentives to restrain trade exist in the nonprofit sector as in the for‐profit sector. Altruistic firms benefit from exploiting market power, even when they would price below cost in the absence of competition. In fact, the efficiency gains from antitrust policy may often be larger for nonprofit firms. Therefore, a policy of promoting competition has social value even when producers’ motivations are altruistic. The argument for uniform antitrust treatment of the two sectors extends to exemptions from antitrust law as well |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Altruism |
Form subdivision |
Antitrust |
General subdivision |
Cost efficiency |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Economic competition |
Form subdivision |
Industrial market |
General subdivision |
Industrial output |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Marginal costs |
Form subdivision |
Market power |
General subdivision |
Market prices |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Posner, Richard A. |
Relator term |
co author |
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
Uniform Resource Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.1086/589704 |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Library of Congress Classification |
Koha item type |
Journal Article |