MARC details
| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01920nam a22002657a 4500 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
|---|
| control field |
ZW-GwMSU |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
|---|
| control field |
20240318094053.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
240312b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER |
|---|
| International Standard Serial Number |
00222186 |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
|---|
| Original cataloging agency |
MSU |
| Language of cataloging |
English |
| Transcribing agency |
MSU |
| Description conventions |
rda |
| 050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
|---|
| Classification number |
HB73 JOU |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Santore, Rudy |
| Relator term |
author |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Patent pools as a solution to efficient licensing of complementary patents? : |
| Remainder of title |
some Experimental Evidence |
| Statement of responsibility, etc. |
created by Rudy Santore, Michael McKee and David Bjornstad |
| 264 #1 - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE |
|---|
| Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture |
Chicago : |
| Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer |
University of Chocago Press, |
| Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice |
2010. |
| 336 ## - CONTENT TYPE |
|---|
| Source |
rdacontent |
| Content type term |
text |
| Content type code |
txt |
| 337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
|---|
| Source |
rdamedia |
| Media type term |
unmediated |
| Media type code |
n |
| 338 ## - CARRIER TYPE |
|---|
| Source |
rdacarrier |
| Carrier type term |
volume |
| Carrier type code |
nc |
| 440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
|---|
| Title |
Journal of Law and Economics |
| Volume/sequential designation |
Volume 53, number 1 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
Production requiring licensing groups of complementary patents implements a coordination game among patent holders, who can price patents by choosing among combinations of fixed and royalty fees. Summed across patents, these fees become the total producer cost of the package of patents. Royalties, because they function as excise taxes, add to marginal costs, resulting in higher prices and reduced quantities of the downstream product and lower payoffs to the patent holders. Using fixed fees eliminates this inefficiency but yields a more complex coordination game in which there are multiple equilibria, which are very fragile in that small mistakes can lead the downstream firm to not license the technology, resulting in inefficient outcomes. We report on a laboratory market investigation of the efficiency effects of coordinated pricing of patents in a patent pool. We find that poolâlike pricing agreements can yield fewer coordination failures in the pricing of complementary patents. |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Patents |
| General subdivision |
Licensing |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
McKee, Michael |
| Relator term |
co author |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Bjornstad, David |
| Relator term |
co author |
| 856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
|---|
| Uniform Resource Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.1086/600078 |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Library of Congress Classification |
| Koha item type |
Journal Article |