Midlands State University Library

Owning versus renting : (Record no. 164278)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01875nam a22002777a 4500
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field ZW-GwMSU
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20240318093747.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 240312b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER
International Standard Serial Number 00222186
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency MSU
Language of cataloging English
Transcribing agency MSU
Description conventions rda
050 ## - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number HB73 JOU
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Casas‐Arce, Pablo
Relator term author
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Owning versus renting :
Remainder of title do Courts Matter?/
Statement of responsibility, etc. created by Pablo Casas‐Arce and Albert Saiz
264 #1 - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture Chicago :
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer University of Chicago Press,
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice 2010.
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE
Source rdacontent
Content type term text
Content type code txt
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE
Source rdamedia
Media type term unmediated
Media type code n
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE
Source rdacarrier
Carrier type term volume
Carrier type code nc
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE
Title Journal of Law and Economics
Volume/sequential designation Volume 53, number 1
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. We develop a legal contract enforcement theory of the decision to own or lease. The allocation of ownership rights will minimize enforcement costs when the legal system is inefficient. In particular, when legal enforcement of contracts is costly, there will be a shift from arrangements that rely on such enforcement (such as a rental agreement) toward other forms that do not (such as direct ownership). We then test this prediction and show that costly enforcement of rental contracts hampers the development of the rental housing market in a cross section of countries. We argue that this association is not the result of reverse causation from a developed rental market to more investor protective enforcement and is not driven by alternative institutional channels. The results provide supportive evidence for the importance of legal contract enforcement for market development and the optimal allocation of property rights
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Cities
Form subdivision Contract enforcement
General subdivision Contracts
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Housing
Form subdivision Instrumental variables
General subdivision Investors
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Leases
Form subdivision Legal systems
General subdivision Market development
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Saiz, Albert
Relator term co author
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier https://doi.org/10.1086/649962
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme Library of Congress Classification
Koha item type Journal Article
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Shelving location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Total Checkouts Full call number Date last seen Copy number Price effective from Koha item type Public note
    Library of Congress Classification     Main Library Main Library - Special Collections 22/03/2011 Vol. 53, no.1 (pages 137-166)   HB73 JOU 12/03/2024 SP7325 12/03/2024 Journal Article For In House Use Only