MARC details
000 -LEADER |
fixed length control field |
02010nam a22002777a 4500 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
control field |
ZW-GwMSU |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
control field |
20240318100435.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
fixed length control field |
240311b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER |
International Standard Serial Number |
00222186 |
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
Original cataloging agency |
MSU |
Language of cataloging |
English |
Transcribing agency |
MSU |
Description conventions |
rda |
050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
Classification number |
HB73 JOU |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Berry, Christopher R. |
Relator term |
author |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
Title |
Fiscal consequences of electoral institutions |
Statement of responsibility, etc. |
created by Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E. Gersen |
264 #1 - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE |
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture |
Chicago : |
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer |
University of Chicago Press, |
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice |
2009 |
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE |
Source |
rdacontent |
Content type term |
text |
Content type code |
txt |
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
Source |
rdamedia |
Media type term |
unmediated |
Media type code |
n |
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE |
Source |
rdacarrier |
Carrier type term |
volume |
Carrier type code |
nc |
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
Title |
Journal of Law and Economics |
Volume/sequential designation |
Volume 52, number 3 |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
Summary, etc. |
here are more than 500,000 elected local government officials in the United States. The most electorally dense county has more than 20 times the average number of elected officials per capita. This paper offers the first systematic investigation of the link between electoral density and fiscal outcomes. Electoral density presents a tradeoff between accountability and monitoring costs. Increasing the number of specialized elected offices promotes issue unbundling, reducing slack between citizen preferences and government policy; but the costs of monitoring a larger number of officials may offset these benefits, producing greater latitude for politicians to pursue their own goals at the expense of citizen interests. We predict diminishing returns to electoral density and a -shaped relationship between the number of elected local officials and government fidelity to citizen preferences. We find that public sector size decreases with electoral density up to a point, beyond which budgets grow as more officials are added |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Censuses |
Form subdivision |
Cogs |
General subdivision |
County governments |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Elected officials |
Form subdivision |
Electoral systems |
General subdivision |
Government spending |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Jurisdiction |
Form subdivision |
Local government |
General subdivision |
Political elections |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Gersen, Jacob E. |
Relator term |
co author |
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
Uniform Resource Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.1086/595764 |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Library of Congress Classification |
Koha item type |
Journal Article |