MARC details
000 -LEADER |
fixed length control field |
02075nam a22002777a 4500 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
control field |
ZW-GwMSU |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
control field |
20240306110535.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
fixed length control field |
240306b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER |
International Standard Serial Number |
00222186 |
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
Original cataloging agency |
MSU |
Language of cataloging |
English |
Transcribing agency |
MSU |
Description conventions |
rda |
050 ## - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
Classification number |
HB73 JOU |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Levenstein, Margaret C. |
Relator term |
author |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
Title |
Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: |
Remainder of title |
determinants of Cartel Duration |
Statement of responsibility, etc. |
by Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow |
264 ## - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE |
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture |
Chicago: |
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer |
University of Chicago Press; |
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice |
2011. |
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE |
Source |
rdacontent |
Content type term |
text |
Content type code |
txt |
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
Source |
rdamedia |
Media type term |
unmediated |
Media type code |
n |
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE |
Source |
rdacarrier |
Carrier type term |
volume |
Carrier type code |
nc |
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
Title |
The Journal of Law and Economics |
Volume/sequential designation |
Volume 54, number 2 |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
Summary, etc. |
We estimate the impact of cartel organizational features, as well as macroeconomic fluctuations and industry structure, on cartel duration using a data set of contemporary international cartels. We estimate a proportional hazards model with competing risks, distinguishing factors that increase the risk of “death by antitrust” from those that affect natural death, including defection, dissension, and entry. Our analysis indicates that the probability of cartel death from any cause increased significantly after 1995, when competition authorities expanded enforcement efforts toward international cartels. We find that fluctuations in firm-specific discount rates have a significant effect on cartel duration, whereas market interest rates do not. Cartels with a compensation scheme—a plan for how the cartel will handle variations in demand—are significantly less likely to break up. In contrast, retaliatory punishments in response to perceived cheating significantly increase the likelihood of natural death. Cartels that have to punish are not stable cartels |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Amnesty |
Form subdivision |
Antitrust |
General subdivision |
Cartels |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Cheating |
Form subdivision |
Collusion |
General subdivision |
Economic fluctuations |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Industrial concentration |
Form subdivision |
Industrial concentration ratios |
General subdivision |
Marketing strategies |
700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Suslow, Valerie Y. |
Relator term |
author |
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
Uniform Resource Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.1086/657660 |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Library of Congress Classification |
Koha item type |
Journal Article |