Midlands State University Library

Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort: (Record no. 164141)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 02035nam a22002777a 4500
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field ZW-GwMSU
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20240306100344.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 240306b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER
International Standard Serial Number 00222186
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency MSU
Language of cataloging English
Transcribing agency MSU
Description conventions rda
050 ## - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number HB73 JOU
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Yin, Haitao
Relator term author
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort:
Remainder of title does the Private Insurance Market Reduce Environmental Accidents?
Statement of responsibility, etc. by Haitao Yin, Howard Kunreuther and Matthew W. White
264 ## - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture Chicago:
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer University of Chicago Press;
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice 2011
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE
Source rdacontent
Content type term text
Content type code txt
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE
Source rdamedia
Media type term unmediated
Media type code n
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE
Source rdacarrier
Carrier type term volume
Carrier type code nc
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE
Title The Journal of Law and Economics
Volume/sequential designation Volume 54, number 2
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. This paper examines whether risk-based pricing promotes risk-reducing effort. Risk-based pricing is common in private insurance markets but rare in government assurance programs. We analyze accidental underground fuel tank leaks—a source of environmental damage to water supplies—over a 14-year period, using disaggregated (facility-level) data and policy variation in financing the cleanup of tank leaks over time. The data indicate that eliminating a state-level government assurance program and switching to private insurance markets to finance cleanups reduce the frequency of underground fuel tank leaks by more than 20 percent. This corresponds to more than 3,000 fuel tank release accidents forgone over 8 years in one state alone, a benefit in avoided cleanup costs exceeding $400 million. These benefits arise because private insurers mitigate moral hazard by providing financial incentives for tank owners to close or replace leak-prone tanks prior to costly accidents
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Insurance deductibles
Form subdivision Insurance policies
General subdivision Insurance premiums
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Insurance providers
Form subdivision Insurance regulation
General subdivision Liability insurance
700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Kunreuther, Howard
Relator term co author
700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name White, Matthew W.
Relator term co author
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier https://doi.org/10.1086/655804
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme Library of Congress Classification
Koha item type Journal Article
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Shelving location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Total Checkouts Full call number Date last seen Copy number Price effective from Koha item type Public note
    Library of Congress Classification     Main Library Main Library - Special Collections 13/02/2012 Vol. 54, no.2 (pages 325-364)   HB73 JOU 06/03/2024 SP10790 06/03/2024 Journal Article For In House Use Only