Midlands State University Library

Regulation and investment in network Industries: (Record no. 164063)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01598nam a22002417a 4500
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field ZW-GwMSU
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20240304134118.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 240304b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER
International Standard Serial Number 00222186
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency MSU
Language of cataloging English
Transcribing agency MSU
Description conventions rda
050 ## - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number HB73 JOU
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Grajek, Michał
Relator term author
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Regulation and investment in network Industries:
Remainder of title evidence from European telecoms
Statement of responsibility, etc. by Michał Grajek and Lars-Hendrik Röller
264 ## - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture Chicago:
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer University of Chicago Press;
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice 2012.
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE
Source rdacontent
Content type term text
Content type code txt
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE
Source rdamedia
Media type term unmediated
Media type code n
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE
Source rdacarrier
Carrier type term volume
Carrier type code nc
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE
Title Journal of law and economics
Volume/sequential designation Volume 55, number 1
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. We provide evidence of an inherent trade-off between access regulation and investment incentives in telecommunications by using a comprehensive data set covering more than 70 fixed-line operators in 20 countries over 10 years. Our econometric model accommodates different investment incentives for incumbents and entrants, a strategic interaction of entrants’ and incumbents’ investments, and endogenous regulation. We find access regulation to have a negative effect on both total industry and individual carrier investment. Thus, promoting market entry by means of regulated access undermines incentives to invest in facilities-based competition. Moreover, we find evidence of a regulatory commitment problem: higher investments by incumbents encourage regulated access provision
700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Röller, Lars-Hendrik
Relator term co author
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier https://doi.org/10.1086/661196
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme Library of Congress Classification
Koha item type Journal Article
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Shelving location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Total Checkouts Full call number Date last seen Copy number Price effective from Koha item type Public note
    Library of Congress Classification     Main Library Main Library - Special Collections 02/12/2012 Vol. 55, no.1 (pages 189-216)   HB73 JOU 04/03/2024 SP12383 04/03/2024 Journal Article For in house only