MARC details
000 -LEADER |
fixed length control field |
01598nam a22002417a 4500 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
control field |
ZW-GwMSU |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
control field |
20240304134118.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
fixed length control field |
240304b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER |
International Standard Serial Number |
00222186 |
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
Original cataloging agency |
MSU |
Language of cataloging |
English |
Transcribing agency |
MSU |
Description conventions |
rda |
050 ## - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
Classification number |
HB73 JOU |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Grajek, Michał |
Relator term |
author |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
Title |
Regulation and investment in network Industries: |
Remainder of title |
evidence from European telecoms |
Statement of responsibility, etc. |
by Michał Grajek and Lars-Hendrik Röller |
264 ## - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE |
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture |
Chicago: |
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer |
University of Chicago Press; |
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice |
2012. |
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE |
Source |
rdacontent |
Content type term |
text |
Content type code |
txt |
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
Source |
rdamedia |
Media type term |
unmediated |
Media type code |
n |
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE |
Source |
rdacarrier |
Carrier type term |
volume |
Carrier type code |
nc |
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
Title |
Journal of law and economics |
Volume/sequential designation |
Volume 55, number 1 |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
Summary, etc. |
We provide evidence of an inherent trade-off between access regulation and investment incentives in telecommunications by using a comprehensive data set covering more than 70 fixed-line operators in 20 countries over 10 years. Our econometric model accommodates different investment incentives for incumbents and entrants, a strategic interaction of entrants’ and incumbents’ investments, and endogenous regulation. We find access regulation to have a negative effect on both total industry and individual carrier investment. Thus, promoting market entry by means of regulated access undermines incentives to invest in facilities-based competition. Moreover, we find evidence of a regulatory commitment problem: higher investments by incumbents encourage regulated access provision |
700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Röller, Lars-Hendrik |
Relator term |
co author |
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
Uniform Resource Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.1086/661196 |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Library of Congress Classification |
Koha item type |
Journal Article |